Bankruptcy can provide a “fresh start” to consumers whose crushing debt leaves them unable to flourish economically or psychologically. Research shows the benefits of giving borrowers a clean slate: bankruptcy filing increases the probability of homeownership by 13.2 percentage points (Dobbie et al., 2017), increases annual earnings by $5,562, decreases five-year mortality by 1.2 percentage points, decreases five-year foreclosure rates by 19.1 percentage points (Dobbie and Song, 2015), and increases the probability of a debtor creating a new business (Parra, 2022). Debt reduction from interest payments (i.e., debt restructuring) decreased the probability of filing for bankruptcy by 33% and increased the probability of employment by 5.1% among other positive outcomes (Dobbie and Song, 2020). Despite these benefits, evidence suggests that fewer debtors file for bankruptcy than would benefit from doing so (Ben-Ishai and Schwartz, 2007; 2020; Gross et al., 2014). Our paper asks why so few debtors file for bankruptcy. Past research proposes that the bankruptcy system is under-utilized because it is expensive: insolvent Canadian debtors must pay between $1,800 to $6,500 in fees on top of a portion of their debts. Although we do not doubt that cost plays a role, our paper explores a second channel: stigma. Our paper explore this second channel in three parts. First, we develop a theoretical model that explains why stigma presents a barrier to bankruptcy filing. Specifically, we distinguish two forms of bankruptcy stigma––other-directed and self-directed––that plausibly limit filing in different ways. Second, we provide the first empirical evidence about the levels of self-stigma amongst debtors who are considering filing for bankruptcy. To do so, we develop a novel scale to measure bankruptcy self-stigma, adapted from research on self-stigma about depression. We then administered this scale to a population of 267 debtors who were actively considering bankruptcy, insofar as they responded to an advertisement for insolvency services. We find that bankruptcy carries stigma that is two orders of magnitude higher than depression, which is itself highly stigmatized. Finally, we consider the implications of stigma for policies that aim to increase participation in the bankruptcy system. We consider how interventions might directly reduce stigma by correcting misinformation about the moral character of insolvent debtors, the causes of bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy process. We also consider the implications of stigma for policies that seek to either increase or remove the human interactions within the bankruptcy system, including counselling and pro se bankruptcy.

We present a family of counter-examples to David Christensen’s Independence Criterion, which is central to the epistemology of disagreement. Roughly, independence requires that, when you assess whether to revise your credence in P upon discovering that someone disagrees with you, you shouldn't rely on the reasoning that lead you to your initial credence in P. To do so would beg the question against your interlocutor. Our counter-examples involve questions where, in the course of your reasoning, you almost fall for an easy-to-miss trick. We argue that you can use the step in your reasoning where you (barely) caught the trick as evidence that someone of your general competence level (your interlocutor) likely fell for it. Our cases show that it's permissible to use your reasoning about disputed matters to disregard an interlocutor’s disagreement, so long as that reasoning is embedded in the right sort of explanation of why she finds the disputed conclusion plausible, even though it's false.

In practice, scientists must convey data in a "representational style" (e.g., as a numerical array or visual representation). Various authors seek to explain the epistemic role of scientific visual representation in terms of formal conventions (e.g., Goodman, Perini, and Kulvicki). Goodman also tends to dismiss the epistemic relevance of human cog- nition. My position is that visual conventions are nonarbitrary, in that they play to scientists' cognitive abilities and limitations. My account draws on Perini's formal analysis, scientific case studies, and empirical literature on global pattern detection in neurotypicals, autistics, and dyslexics.